Thirteen shipowner and industry associations have told the IMO they support a climate deal for shipping. Read the fine print and they’re describing thirteen different deals. With the stalled Net-Zero Framework adoption vote now scheduled to resume in early December 2026, the gap between “we support decarbonisation” and “we support a $380-a-tonne remedial unit” is exactly what gets fought over in the next three weeks — and the outcome sets the carbon-price signal that every hydrogen newbuild and retrofit business case has been modelling around since April 2025.
⚡ TL;DR
- What: The IMO's Net-Zero Framework (NZF) — a global GHG Fuel Intensity (GFI) standard paired with a two-tier carbon price — was approved in April 2025 but blocked from formal adoption in October 2025 after intense US pressure. A resumed vote is scheduled for 4 December 2026, immediately after MEPC 85.
- Why it matters for hydrogen: The size of the carbon price and how strictly LNG's emissions get counted directly determine whether green hydrogen, ammonia, and methanol keep a meaningful cost advantage over gas — or get squeezed out by a watered-down compromise.
- Key numbers: Tier 1 remedial units at USD 100/tCO2eq, Tier 2 at USD 380/tCO2eq, against a 2030 Direct Compliance target of 73.7 gCO2eq/MJ (a 21% cut from the 2008 baseline).
- Timeline: accounting-rules working group 23–27 November 2026 → MEPC 85, 30 November–3 December 2026 → resumed adoption session, 4 December 2026 → earliest entry into force 1 March 2028.
- Watch for: whether the US pressure campaign that produced the October 2025 adjournment repeats itself, and which way the contested LNG accounting rules land.
What’s Actually on the Table
The Net-Zero Framework that MEPC 83 approved in April 2025 is a MARPOL Annex VI amendment built around two linked numbers for every ship over 5,000 GT (domestic-only trades, FPSOs, FSUs, and rigs are excluded):
- A Base target — the minimum every covered ship must hit, or pay the steep penalty.
- A Direct Compliance (DC) target — the stricter bar; miss the Base target but clear nothing, and the cheaper penalty tier applies instead.
Both are expressed as a percentage cut from the 2008 fleet-average GFI of 93.3 gCO2eq/MJ, well-to-wake:
| Year | Base target cut | Base (gCO2eq/MJ) | Direct Compliance cut | DC (gCO2eq/MJ) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2028 | 4% | 89.6 | 17% | 77.4 |
| 2030 | 8% | 85.8 | 21% | 73.7 |
| 2033 | 21.2% | 73.5 | 34.2% | 61.4 |
| 2035 | 30% | 65.3 | 43% | 53.2 |
| 2040 | 65% | 32.7 | not yet set | not yet set |
A ship whose attained GFI sits between the DC and Base targets buys Tier 1 remedial units at USD 100/tCO2eq for the shortfall; fall below the Base target entirely and the whole deficit is priced at the much harsher Tier 2, USD 380/tCO2eq. Both prices apply for the 2028–2030 reporting periods only — MEPC is due to set the post-2030 pricing mechanism by 1 January 2028, and the 2036–2040 glide path isn’t fixed yet either, due by 1 January 2032. None of this is final: it needs formal MARPOL adoption, which requires a two-thirds majority of parties present and voting.
Why the Vote Keeps Slipping
The framework was supposed to be formally adopted at an extraordinary MEPC session in October 2025. It wasn’t. Facing an escalating US campaign — the State Department threatened retaliatory port fees, sanctions, and blocked access to US ports and LNG terminals for supporting states, and individual sanctions against officials who voted yes, with President Trump posting on social media urging governments to “vote NO in London” — a Saudi Arabia-led motion to adjourn passed 57 votes to 49, with 21 abstentions. Several states that had backed the framework in April either abstained or reversed position. The EU stayed supportive throughout.
That bought a year, not a resolution. Since then:
- MEPC 84 (April–May 2026) found a majority of member states still back the framework broadly as approved — but didn’t schedule a vote.
- A first intersessional working group (1–4 September 2026) tried to settle the accounting-rules disputes and ended without agreed text.
- A second intersessional session, 23–27 November 2026, is meant to hand the chair something to present at MEPC 85.
- MEPC 85 runs 30 November–3 December 2026, with the resumed extraordinary adoption session currently pencilled in for 4 December 2026 — itself subject to confirmation once MEPC 85 opens. If it goes ahead and passes, the earliest entry into force is 1 March 2028.
Treat the December 4 date as provisional: most of the reporting on it comes from trade press and law-firm client notes rather than IMO’s own published agenda, and the exact same US pressure dynamics that produced last year’s adjournment haven’t gone away.
The Industry Split That Determines Hydrogen’s Advantage
The Hellenic Shipping News piece this is responding to lists thirteen companies and associations voicing “support” for an IMO deal — but the details they’re pushing for pull in opposite directions, and some of those details decide how much of a compliance edge hydrogen fuels actually keep:
| Group | Carbon price ask | Fuel standard ask | Accounting stance |
|---|---|---|---|
| ICS | USD 10–20/tCO2e, combustion only | 30% GFI cut by 2040 (vs. 65% approved) | — |
| WSC | Higher; fleet-average illustrated at ~USD 74/t by 2030 | Backs an ambitious standard | Stricter counting |
| SEA-LNG / Ipieca | — | Oppose a minimum GHG threshold for fuel eligibility | Want lower counted emissions for LNG |
| ECSA / ICS / WSC / SEA-LNG | — | — | Want the EU’s FuelEU/ETS reviewed, harmonised, or withdrawn once a global deal exists |
| Tuvalu (at MEPC 85) | Raise Tier 1 from $100 to $300/t, keep Tier 2 at $380 | — | — |
Two of these fights matter more than the rest for anyone pricing a hydrogen newbuild or retrofit against LNG:
The LNG accounting dispute is the one to watch closest. Fossil LNG’s well-to-wake GFI is genuinely contested — it depends heavily on methane slip from dual-fuel engines and upstream leakage, which is exactly the input SEA-LNG and Ipieca want counted more generously and WSC wants counted more strictly. Swing that number down and LNG can clear the 2030 Direct Compliance target (73.7 gCO2eq/MJ) on its own without a drop of green fuel involved — which removes most of the regulatory pressure pushing owners toward hydrogen, ammonia, or methanol as a compliance fuel rather than just LNG as a cheaper bridge. Swing it up, and LNG-fuelled ships face real Tier 1 exposure that only genuine zero/near-zero fuels avoid.
Tuvalu’s Tier 1 proposal cuts the other way. Narrowing the gap between Tier 1 ($100→$300) and Tier 2 ($380) sharply raises the cost of partial compliance — a ship sitting between the two targets stops being able to treat a modest blend as a cheap half-measure. That squeeze rewards fuels that clear the Direct Compliance target outright — which, on current well-to-wake assumptions, means green ammonia, green methanol, and liquid or compressed green hydrogen (commonly modelled around 20 gCO2eq/MJ, with liquefaction boil-off pushing LH2 toward the higher end of that range), all of which sit comfortably under even the 2035 DC target of 53.2 gCO2eq/MJ. Grey (fossil-derived) ammonia or hydrogen does not get this benefit — its upstream production footprint can leave it no better than HFO, and in some production routes worse.
The EU Backstop Doesn’t Go Away Either Way
ICS, WSC, SEA-LNG, and ECSA are also asking IMO member states to pressure the EU into reviewing or withdrawing FuelEU Maritime and the EU ETS once — if — a global mechanism is adopted, on the argument that a global and a regional carbon price shouldn’t stack. That’s worth tracking for a different reason: we’ve covered how the EU’s proposed SMAP mechanism already reimburses part of the hydrogen fuel-price gap on top of FuelEU’s compliance credit and the ETS zero-factor. If the global NZF emerges from December weaker than that regional stack — a real possibility if the ICS price and 2040 target proposals gain ground — European trades remain the more reliable near-term demand signal for hydrogen bunkers regardless of what MEPC decides. If industry succeeds in getting the EU rules unwound in favour of a lighter global standard, that backstop is exactly what’s at risk down the line.
Why This Matters
For a naval architect costing out an LH2 fuel-cell retrofit or an ammonia dual-fuel newbuild, this isn’t an abstract diplomatic story — the Tier 1/Tier 2 price gap and the DC target glide path are the carbon-price assumptions that go straight into the fuel-switch payback calculation. A framework adopted as approved in April 2025 gives hydrogen and ammonia a clear, growing cost advantage over unabated fossil fuels through the 2030s. A framework gutted to ICS’s proposed $10–20/t price and a 30%-by-2040 standard gives LNG a much longer runway as the “compliant enough” fuel, and pushes the breakeven case for switching to hydrogen out by years. Whether the resumed session on 4 December actually votes — and on which version of the text — is the single most consequential near-term input into that math.
Challenges and Open Questions
- Does the 4 December session even reach a vote, or does the same US pressure that produced the October 2025 adjournment force another delay?
- Does the 23–27 November working group produce agreed accounting-rules text in time, after the September session failed to?
- Which way the LNG methane-slip and upstream-leakage accounting dispute lands — this alone shifts LNG between “clears Direct Compliance on its own” and “faces real Tier 1 exposure.”
- Does Tuvalu’s push to raise Tier 1 to $300/t gain support, or does the ICS’s much lower price proposal pull the final number down instead?
- The 2036–2040 Base/DC glide path and the post-2030 remedial-unit pricing mechanism are both still unset, due respectively by January 2032 and January 2028 — long-term fuel investment decisions are being made against targets that don’t fully exist yet.
- If a global deal lands softer than the EU’s FuelEU/ETS stack, does the industry push to unwind the EU rules actually succeed, and on what timeline?
Sources
- Hellenic Shipping News — “Shipping sector backs an IMO climate deal, but not all of the details”
- DNV — GHG Fuel Intensity (Net-Zero Framework)
- Marine Insight — “U.S. Pressure Delays Adoption of World’s First Carbon Price On Shipping By A Year”
- Maritime Executive — “Trump Takes Aim at IMO and the Net-Zero Framework at the UN”
Meeting dates, the precise December 4 vote slot, and the proposed Tier 1/Tuvalu pricing change are drawn from trade press and law-firm notes rather than IMO’s own published agenda as of this writing — treat them as indicative and verify against IMO’s official MEPC 85 documentation before relying on them for a compliance decision.